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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the interaction of real and financial flexibility and their effects on 
firm’s investment and financing decisions. We use a system of interdependent dynamic 
partial adjustment models to capture the effects of flexibility and feedback from firm-
specific adjustments towards the optimal levels of investment and debt. The empirical 
analysis is based on a large panel of multinational paper and pulp companies observed 
between 1992 and 2002. The results suggest that the decisions and flexibilities are 
related, interdependent and interacting, although financial adjustment costs are likely to 
dominate decision-making. Profitability is found to have strongest impact on the 
adjustment costs, which seem to be convex and non-constant over time and across 
firms.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper gets its motivation from capital structure theories that seem relatively sound, 
but are actually somewhat contradictory or ambiguous relative to the empirical 
evidence. Hence, the capital structure theories or indicators used to explain leverage or 
the financing process itself or their mixture is still at least partly misunderstood or at 
least unobserved. This is perhaps because many empirical studies of capital structure are 
static and use observed ratios as proxies for optimal leverage.1 The assumption that 
observed ratios equal optimal ratios means that there is an instantaneous adjustment to 
the optimal without any costs. However, in the real world decisions are often dynamic 
and adjustments to firm-specific optimal levels are costly. In fact, these adjustment 
costs can control the firms’ willingness to adjust, because they may not necessarily find 
it cost effective to adjust to the optimal frequently or fully even if they are aware of 
their state of in-optimality.  
Indeed, dynamic models with the adjustment costs have improved the explanatory 
power and understanding of capital structure models and decisions. Jalivand and Harris 
(1984) find that firms’ financing decisions are made to adjust partially to exogenously 
determined long-term financial targets, assuming that the deviations from the targets are 
characterized by the speed of adjustment, which is allowed to be firm and time-specific. 
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) instead create a dynamic inventory-adjustment 
model in the presence of recapitalization costs, which uses an observed debt-ratio range 
(maximum and minimum values) as an empirical measure for capital structure. 
Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg (1999) (also Kumbhakar, Hehsmati and Hjalmarsson 
(2002) and Heshmati (2002)) endogenize the adjustment factor, specify the targets in 
financing decisions, and introduce flexibility in to the speed of adjustment towards the 
target. Despite these developments, the dynamic capital structure literature still has a 
number of shortcomings. One important shortcoming is that investment and financing 
decisions are studied separately. Also, the flexibilities related to the decisions as well as 
the interaction of these flexibilities with each other and the underlying decisions are 
often overlooked. 
The purpose of this study is to overcome these shortcomings of dynamic empirical 
capital structure models by using a system of interdependent dynamic partial adjusting 
models that allow us to capture the effects of separate but interdependent and 
simultaneous investment and financing decisions. This approach allows us to compare 
real and financial flexibilities measured through firm-specific adjustments to the 
optimal (i.e. their speed, costs and efficiency) and also the feedbacks related to these 
real and financial decisions. As a result, our approach should better acknowledge the 
impact of a firm’s flexibility on substitutability and complementary effects of the 
investment and financing decisions that depend on both the flexibility available and the 
expected adjustment costs. Thus, better recognition of the effects of interacting 
flexibility is likely to reduce biases in the results, allow for non-partial inferences, and 
improve our understanding of the combined and interdependent corporate investment 
and financing decisions.  
                                                 
1 For excellent discussion of capital structure and its problems in empirical measurement see e.g. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), and the references there. 
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Empirical results are based on a large sample of multinational paper and pulp producing 
companies observed between 1992 and 2002. These results suggests first of all that our 
system of dynamic partial adjusting models performs substantially better than the static 
models. Also, the speed of adjustment is found to be non-constant, which supports use 
of the flexible speed of adjustment function chosen. The results also show that the 
investment and financing decisions and the flexibilities related to them are 
interdependent and interacting due to the market imperfections found, which seem to 
invalidate the complete and perfect market hypothesis. Especially, the financial 
adjustment costs seem to dominate firms’ decision-making. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
profitability is found to be the prominent key determinant factor of the adjustment costs, 
which seem to be otherwise convex and non-constant.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the readers to 
the theoretical background and motivations for the simultaneous determination of 
investment and financing decisions depending on the interacting real and financial 
flexibility. Section 3 introduces a system of interdependent dynamic partial adjusting 
models based on the theoretical hypothesis. The data and the set of variables used to 
capture the effects of the interaction between the real and financial flexibility are 
described in Section 4. The empirical results are then presented and discussed in Section 
5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  THEORIES OF REAL AND FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY 
The paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) on the perfect and complete market 
hypothesis shows that if real and financial decisions are to have any effect on each other 
it is because of market frictions: tax and bankruptcy costs, agency costs or asymmetric 
information, whose effects are further amplified by the asset specificity2.3 Hence, if 
firms cannot instantaneously and costlessly undo their value creating decisions due to 
the existing market frictions, firms’ investment and financing decisions become 
dependent on each other and the uncertain future expectations of the economic 
environment. Although this uncertainty about the future makes the systematic benefits 
of economic actions possible, it can also cause irrevocable costs, which are expected to 
motivate firms to maintain flexibility because of hedging, speculation, or transaction 
purposes.  
Flexibility is a key mechanism to control investment dynamics, which arise because of 
the irreversibility of real and financial decisions and the uncertainty related to them. 
According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the irreversibility arises in capital investments 
                                                 
2 Firm-specific assets are assets that are tailored to the firms to help them to create value by reducing their 
production costs, improve product or process quality, and differentiate their products from their 
competitors. These assets are usually intangible such as, R&D and brand, and thus, have lower collateral 
values. Asset specificity is thus closely related to real flexibility in which the assets with multiple uses 
and low redeployment costs tend to have higher market values. 
3 For the case of taxes see e.g. Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977), and De Angelo and Masulis 
(1980); for bankruptcy costs see e.g. Haugen and Senbet (1978) and Altman (1984); for agency cost see 
e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986); and for 
asymmetric information see e.g. Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Myers (1984), and Myers and 
Majluf (1984). The theories of capital structure are well documented in e.g. Harris and Raviv (1991) and 
the references there.  
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due to firm-specificity, industry-specificity and lemon’s premium4. Here irreversibility 
can be interpreted as an adjustment cost which on the one hand creates an incentive to 
learn through uncertain decisions because the waiting and adjustment for new 
information is not costless or independent of the past actions, but on the other hand, 
enhances the negative impact of uncertainty and its costs. The effect of uncertainty in 
decisions is generalized by Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (1996), who point out that 
most decisions involve acquisition and exercise of several options simultaneously. 
These options reflect the firm’s flexibility and their net effect is often ambiguous5 due 
to the asymmetric and correlated effects of different underlying sources of uncertainty. 
Firms’ flexibility can be stored or invested in real and/or financial assets (hereon 
referred as real and financial flexibility). Financial flexibility may be beneficial for 
shareholders due to costly external financing, if it reduces the agency cost of debt 
related to under-investment and asset substitution problems or the cost of information 
asymmetry related to market transactions (e.g. discount or premium, signalling costs 
and/or information given to outsiders, and payments made to third parties). These 
benefits are, however, subject to agency cost of equity caused by management’s 
willingness to risk-aversion and/or over-investment. A firm’s real flexibility instead, on 
one hand, increases the liquidation and collateral values of its assets and thus, increases 
its debt capacity by lowering default risk and expected bankruptcy costs (Mauer and 
Triantis (1994)). On the other hand, it also decreases debt capacity by facilitating an 
increase in the portfolio of risky projects, which promotes risk-shifting and assets 
substitution, especially if limited liability is assumed (Mello and Parsons (1992)). 
Clearly, these flexibilities seem to overlap in their effects. Hence, Mauer and Triantis 
(1994) state that real and financial flexibilities are partial substitutes.6  
Still, although firms may benefit from having flexibility when the opportunity cost of 
investing in flexibility is low relative to the cost of future market transactions, 
maintained flexibility itself is also costly. For instance, Kim, Mauer and Sherman 
(1998) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stultz, and Williamson (1999) show that investment in 
liquid (or flexible) assets is costly because firm foregoes investment in less liquid but 
more productive fixed assets. In general, when the uncertainty over the decisions 
increases, the value of flexible (i.e. shorter-lived and more liquid) assets also increases, 
although at the expense of inflexible (i.e. more long-term and more irreversible) assets, 
such as new capital investments. The value of flexibility then arises even at the higher 
                                                 
4 As lenders can more easily observe industry-wide risk and its effect within industry firms, it is the 
unobservable firm-specific risk that makes outsiders demand a premium or discount in market 
transactions. Still, investments that rely on private information and unique, firm-specific assets are the 
ones that provide excess returns and competitive advantage to the firm because they are hard to imitate or 
copy by the outsiders. 
5 Increase in uncertainty, on the one hand, raises the marginal valuation of an additional unit of capital 
and hence stimulates investments (see Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983)), but on the other hand it also 
increases opportunity cost. Increased opportunity cost tends to decrease the value of investments and thus, 
promote waiting (McDonald and Siegel (1986)). 
6 Quality (i.e. risk and return) of investments naturally affects firms’ financial structures. Brander and 
Lewis (1986), Chevalier (1995), and Zingales (1998) show, however, that financial structure in turn can 
have impact on firms’ performances on the real markets. According to Trigeorgis (1993), the interaction 
between the real and financial flexibility should be emphasized whenever it involves large or complex, 
uncertain and multi-staged investments or growth options that take time to build. 
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relative price, because the switching option (i.e. the opportunity to exchange assets to 
some other assets at low costs) attached to them is thought to be more valuable.  
Although in the theory, firms’ real and financial decisions and the related flexibilities 
are often assumed to be independent from each other, in the reality, they are more or 
less interdependent (See e.g. Mackay (1999) for empirical evidence). Indeed, firms’ 
flexibility can be defined as the capacity to adjust the use of their real and financial 
resources under uncertainty to meet their evolving goals of long-term value creation 
(Donaldson (1969)). Financial flexibility can further be defined as firms’ ability to 
reallocate cash flows between bond and stockholders through recapitalisations over time 
to better match the evolution of operational risk into their long-term value creation. 
Hence, changes in debt levels reflect adjustments that can provide information on firms’ 
financial flexibility. As financial flexibility preserves mainly real flexibility the 
marginal adjustment cost of investing in financial flexibility increases as the cost 
difference between external and internal financing and the uncertainty over investments 
and their profitability decreases. Hence, firms that lack financial flexibility are in fact 
more likely to face binding financial constraints7, which may also force them to adjust 
fixed investments relative to cash-flow shocks. Here real flexibility refers to firms’ real 
resources that improve their ability to meet future operating and investment needs or 
simply growth options. Motivation for the real flexibility arises because the marginal 
adjustment costs of acquiring and installing capital rise as investments rise. In addition, 
firms cannot without additional cost store, delay or maintain new or in-progress 
investments, i.e. adjustment is costly. Now, if firms are allowed to operate many risky 
projects simultaneously, then we have to think of firms as choosing their optimal 
investment policy to alter their capital stocks and thus, the adjustments in capital stock 
are likely to provide information on their real flexibility.  
To test the effects of flexibility, we next turn to the empirical modeling issues, where 
we study firms’ adjustments to their firm-specific optimal investment and debt levels to 
provide information on their real and financial flexibilities and their interaction as well 
as effects on investment and financing decisions. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The principal idea behind the capital structure theories is to find the optimal debt level 
by trading off the costs and benefits of the additional debt that can imply the interior 
optimal debt level for a firm8. However, most financial studies use one-period perfect 
                                                 
7 In such cases, the marginal cost of external financing exceeds the opportunity cost of internally 
generated funds for a leveraged firm (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Hubbard (1998)). 
8 The trade-off theory includes bankruptcy and agency cost models where the optimal debt ratios are 
found by trading off the tax advantage of interest rates on debt and other benefits of debt against the 
various costs of debt. These costs include increased probability and costs of bankruptcy that arise from 
the decrease in the market values of assets, the threat of payments made to the third parties, and agency 
costs of debt. On the other hand, asymmetric information models state that there is no optimal capital 
structure for a firm and that the use of a specific financing source is based on minimisation of the costs of 
asymmetric information. The empirical criticism of the trade-off theory is that new equity issues represent 
only a small fraction of firms’ financing and that there is a negative relation between debt and 
profitability as predicted by the asymmetric information models. On the other hand, industry effects such 
as mean reversion of debt ratios and negative relation of debt and non-debt tax shields favour the trade-off 
theory contrary to asymmetric information models. 
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and complete market frameworks and thus study the financial decisions separately and 
independently of investments. As a result, these decisions become static and the effects 
of uncertainty and irreversibility on them as well as their interdependence with real 
decisions are often ignored. The real and financial decisions are in practise, however, 
made simultaneously under imperfect and incomplete information. This makes the 
decisions interacting and interdependent as well as dynamic, which emphasises the 
importance of flexibility and adjustment costs issues. Hence, many earlier financial 
models underestimate the complexity and variation over time in interdependent real and 
financial decisions that arise from the intended a priori policy and from the uncertainty 
over investment opportunities, financial structures and adjustment costs9. It is therefore 
important to examine firm-specific adjustment processes where firms are assumed to 
switch between constrained and unconstrained regimes depending upon the shifts in 
their adjustment needs and costs, and flexibility available.  
Now, if the adjustment needs are defined as the difference between endogenous targets 
and current observed levels, we must separate policy from the actions taken. This is so 
because although firms may not be at their optimal in any point of time, they still may 
behave optimally, if adjustment costs and the flexibility that can be used to smooth the 
costs of the adjustments needed are taken into account. This smoothing behavior, i.e. the 
use of flexibility, is a result of firms wanting to minimize negative effects of uncertainty 
and their possible costs to a firm’s value creation by reducing the adjustment costs 
related to costly changes in firm’s expectations of future investment opportunities and 
profitability. Thus, this behavior aims at finding an optimal combination of investment 
and debt levels that maximizes the firm’s value in the long-term. In this process, the 
individual decision-specific effects are of course most important. However, because 
firms’ flexibility in reality is multidimensional and interdependent and thus, somewhat 
invisible in the financial statements, especially if firms are allowed to operate many 
risky projects simultaneously, an empirical analysis should instead think of firms as 
choosing their optimal policy to alter their investment and debt levels to capture the 
effects of flexibility. 
To take the above arguments into account, we use dynamic partial adjusting models that 
allow us not only to capture the determinants of the optimal levels of investments and 
debt but also the adjustments towards their optimal or target levels. These endogenous 
firm-specific adjustments contain information about the firm’s flexibility and its 
indicators: speed, cost and efficiency of adjustment in response to external shocks and 
changes in market conditions. However, separate dynamic partial adjusting models for 
real and financial decisions are not entirely satisfactory because the single equation 
technique does not permit analysis of simultaneity. To avoid incorrect inferences of 
causalities or feedbacks among the policy choices, i.e. in our case between 
interdependent and interacting real and financial decisions, we use the system of 
simultaneous equations to identify the effects of the interacting decisions by controlling 
the unobservable effects. Finally, as firm-specific effects are often shown to be most 
crucial for a firm’s success, we prefer to use panel data to control the heterogeneity over 
firms and over time. 
                                                 
9 Jalivand and Harris (1984) are among the first to recognise the importance of a dynamic approach with 
adjustment costs in finance. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) instead create dynamic inventory-
adjustment model with recapitalisation costs. Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg (1999) endogenize the 
flexible adjustment factor and the targets in financial decisions. 
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Let’s now take a closer look at our model specifications, where we let optimal levels of 
the key variables, investment and financing decisions be determined by the following 
formulas:  
(1)   
),,,ˆ(
),,,ˆ(
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where  denote optimal real and financial decisions of firm i at time t, 
 are their predicted counterparts or feedbacks from one decision to another, 
 are vectors of firm- and time-variant, time-variant and firm-variant 
explanatory variables, and f and g indicates functional forms. The latter two 
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variables are often replaced by firm and time dummies. The variables may partially 
overlap across the two equations. Allowing changes in the observed levels to have affect 
the changes in the optimal levels here captures the dynamics because the changes in 
observed levels cause the optimal to shift. This dynamics of the changing optimal has 
been neglected in many time series models, for example. Still under ideal conditions, 
the observed levels should equal the optimal, i.e. *itit RR =  and  as in static 
models. In a dynamic setting, this means that 
*
itit FF =
1, − = 1,* −−− tiitit RR ti RR and 
.  1, −ti*1, − −= itti FF−it FF
However, if the adjustment is found to be costly (mainly because of market 
imperfections), then firms may find it optimal to adjust only partially:  
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where the  are adjustment parameters that measure the speed of adjustment 
or the rate of convergence of observed to optimal levels of investment and debt. This 
means that although firms may not be at their optimal at any point of time, they may 
still behave optimally if adjustment costs are taken into account. Thus, the equation (2) 
also represents an equilibrium relation, where adjustment costs are given. For example, 
if , the adjustment is made fully within one period and the firm is in its 
optimum. If , the adjustment falls short, and respectively, if 
, there is an over-adjustment. However, if instead , 
there is no external adjustment and firms adjust internally using flexibility, for example. 
These periodical adjustments also mean that changes in factors affecting the optimal 
beyond time t are unanticipated and therefore, current and past optimal values can be 
used to predict the future behaviour of the firm.  
F
it
R
it δδ and
1or =Fitδ
1<Ritδ
1>Fitδ
1=Ritδ
or1>Rit
1or <Fitδ
δ 0or0 << FitRit δδ
Interestingly, the adjustment parameter is allowed to be flexible, which is justified 
because the costs of adjustment do not have to be convex or constant as is often 
assumed in many dynamic models. This is true especially if fixed costs or other non-
quadratic effects are allowed to exist in the adjustment (Abel and Eberly (1994)). It is 
also important because of the assumed heterogeneity in the cost of adjustment among 
firms, industries and over time. Hence, the adjustment parameter is a function of: 
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(3)   
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where  are vectors of firm- and time-specific, time-specific, and firm-
specific determinants of the speed of adjustment. The determinants of the adjustment 
parameter measure adjustment costs that characterize the costs of shifting from one 
level to another rather than the actual cost associated with specific levels of investments 
or debt. The positive sign of an adjustment cost parameter indicates that the variable 
increases the speed of adjustment and vice versa. In the presence of adjustment costs, 
the ratios ( and can be used to measure the degree of optimality or 
efficiency in investment and debt levels without any future implications. As the speed 
of adjustment carries information on the speed, costs and efficiency of adjustment, it 
can also be used as a proxy for firms’ flexibility.  
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To avoid the misspecification errors caused by aggregation effects, the absence of 
adjustment costs and the employment of non-dynamic affects, the equation (2) can be 
written as follows:  
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The  are the random error terms specified as a two-way error component 
structure as follows: 
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where λµ and are unobservable firm-specific and time-specific effects, and v  
are random error terms which are assumed to be independently and identically, 
normally distributed, with means 0 and variances 
F
it
R
it vand
F
v
R
v
22 and σσ . The λµ and effects 
can be treated as fixed or random effects. In the latter case, the effects are assumed to be 
distributed with a mean of 0 and variances FR 22 , µµ RF 22 and , λλ σσσσ . These components 
are assumed to be independent of each other and of the explanatory variables. The 
parameter estimates in the dynamic models reflect short-run elasticities of real and 
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financial variables or flexibility components with respect to changes in the explanatory 
variables. The long-run counterparts are obtained by multiplying the short-run 
elasticities with the adjustment parameters. 
Now, one possible problem with this approach is that the explanatory variables are 
determined jointly with the dependent variables, that is they are not exogenously given. 
To solve the problem, we let firms have two separate, but interacting decisions, say one 
for investments and the other for financing, each defined according to equation (4). 
These equations determine the optimal levels for the dependent variables. However, as 
the decisions are assumed to be interacting and made simultaneously, we have to allow 
feedback to enter in the equations as shown in equation (5). The predicted values for 
debt ( ) and investment (Fˆ Rˆ ) are based on the static models with similar specifications 
as those in the dynamic model but based on a single equation technique. After doing 
this and the other procedures above, we are finally able to analyse empirically the 
effects of real and financial flexibility on each other and on the interacting investment 
and financing decisions. 
 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
Before a discussion of the variables, we will briefly describe the data that we have used. 
We have used the DATASTREAM – company account data on the paper industry firms 
that have total annual sales exceeding USD 200M observed during 1992 to 2002. Our 
empirical results are based on an unbalanced panel of 87 firms. We have imputed a 
number of missing unit observations using lag, lead, or mean values by firm. After 
making these adjustments to the data, we received a sample size of 629 observations to 
be used in the estimation. These observations are observed consecutively, but we allow 
for exit and entry of the firm. Our data thus consists mainly of large firms in mature but 
cyclical industry that are expected to be capital intensive. In addition, investments are 
expected to be mostly fixed and long-lasting. Firms’ financial statuses are expected to 
be quite solid. The data and the variables used are described more in detail in Appendix 
1. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. 
The variables included as the explanatory variables are assumed to provide flexibility 
for the decision variables and thus, are here also called flexibility components. As the 
flexibility components are assumed to be partial substitutes or complements for the 
decision variables, we observe the entire set of variables at the same period. Following 
the standard practise in investment and finance literature, we have also divided each 
variable by the beginning of the period replacement value of fixed assets or book value 
of total assets depending on the decisions in question. This transformation from the 
levels to ratios makes it possible to compare investment and financing ratios over time 
and across firms and thus, is a standard way to gain trend-stationary series. The 
transformation has also the advantage of minimizing the heteroscedasticity in the data 
by normalizing the variables by size.  
The data in Table 1 shows that firms’ investments (I) in net fixed assets totalled around 
10% (28%) of the firms’ net fixed assets (K). Real working capital (RWC) seems to take 
an even large share of firms’ net fixed asset with its mean 29% (51%). Intangible assets 
(IT) have similar share as the fixed investments of the fixed assets, i.e. mean 10% 
(21%). Sales of firms under study are growing (G) on average 10% (31%). The cash 
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flow (CF) to fixed assets, which is to proxy effect of internal financing, has a mean of 
24% (24%). The numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations. All these variables 
of interest seem to have approximately equal or greater variance compared with the 
fixed investments, which could imply that they promote real flexibility. 
Long-term debt (D) makes only 26% (32%) of the total assets (A). Mean financial 
working capital (FWC) is -4% (14%). Tangible assets (K) make a large share of total 
assets, their mean value is 57% (23%) and thus they provide good collateral for the 
lenders. As the non-debt tax shields (NDTS) can measure different things depending on 
its denominator, we have used two measures for it. The first measure, NTDS/A 
measured as depreciation to total assets, is a proxy for the amount of information 
asymmetry with mean 5% (5%) and the second measure, NTDS/CF measured as 
depreciation to cash-flows, is a proxy for tax effects and has a mean 50% (46%) of the 
cash flows. Again the numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
In accounting for the negative effects of multicollinearity, we have taken a look at the 
correlations between the variables presented in Appendix 2. A positive correlation 
between the dependent variables and explanatory variables is desirable, but not a 
correlation among the explanatory variables, which causes difficulties in separating 
their effects from each other. Low correlation coefficients indicate an absence of serious 
multicollinearity. A few exceptions, indicating only a noticeable (greater than ±0.50) 
positive correlation is observed between investment and fixed assets (0.63, i.e. 
investment in fixed assets is naturally correlated with the fixed assets), growth and debt 
(0.57, i.e. growing companies are able to borrow more), profitability and share of 
internal financing (0.88, i.e. obviously one expects such high correlation) and size and 
variance of cash-flows (0.92, i.e. changes in assets and cash flows follow each other).  
Next we will discuss the set of explanatory variables and their inter-relations. The 
variables are grouped by the set of determinants of the real flexibility, financial 
flexibility, and the speeds of adjustment in the two decision equations. 
 
4.1. Determinants of real flexibility  
The real or investment decision (R) model given the conditions discussed above is 
specified as the following: 
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The real flexibility is captured through the adjustments of investment levels towards 
their optimal levels. Optimal investment is allowed to vary across firms and over time 
and be a function of observable determining variables. The variable I denotes 
investments in fixed assets and it is measured as the difference between the current and 
previous year’s net fixed assets. The K variable represents the replacement value of 
long-term capital stock and it is proxied with net fixed assets, i.e. fixed assets less 
depreciation. However, before making the adjustment to the investments, a firm may 
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find it cost effective to use flexibility components related to its investments, such as real 
working capital (RWC), labour (L) and intangibles (IT) assets.  
By reducing the investments in these flexibility components that are competing with the 
fixed investments over firms’ scarce resources, firms can free resources to enable their 
new fixed investments. In addition, growth (G) in sales can describe investment demand 
and especially, its cyclical nature. Furthermore, as the ability to finance investments 
internally (i.e. partial proxy for investment supply) is often found to be one of the most 
important variables describing the investment behaviour of firms, we also include the 
cash flow (CF) as an explanatory variable. As the uncertainty can have negative effects 
on investment, we measure business risk and its effect on investments through the 
variance of cash flow measured in logarithm (LVCF). 
Working capital defined as current assets less current liabilities is an important use of 
funds and therefore competes with fixed investment for firms’ limited financial 
resources. Thus, it should also be negatively correlated with them. In general, if changes 
in the level of fixed investments are costly and firms cannot without costs raise external 
financing to counteract cash-flow fluctuations, then firms, especially the financially 
constrained, can use working capital to absorb negative shocks (Fazzari and Petersen 
(1993)). However, only part of the working capital can be used as a proxy for a short-
term real flexibility of a firm. To separate real flexibility from the rest of the working 
capital, or the financial flexibility, we let real working capital (RWC) equal working 
capital less cash and marketable securities and short-term debt due less than one year. 
This leaves inventories, account receivables and non-debt account payables to be 
studied as real flexibility. This separation procedure recognises that cash and marketable 
securities and short-term debt are financial variables rather than operating decision 
variables. For example, inventories that are an important part of real working capital can 
be used to level out pro-cyclically the effects of cash-flow shocks10. Real working 
capital is expected to be negatively related to changes in investment levels. 
Intangible asset (IT) is measured as a firm’s total intangible assets. The role of 
intangible assets is to capture the effects of asset specificity or uniqueness. The reason is 
that investments in intangibles cannot be readily redeployed. Firm-specificity in assets 
increases with investments in intangible assets and thus tends not only to lower a firm’s 
leverage but also eventually its fixed investments. Hence, to enable current fixed 
investments or to improve their quality on external financing markets, a firm can reduce 
its investment in intangible assets, i.e. activated11 R&D and advertising costs. If 
intangible assets have high adjustments cost, we would expect only severe and long-
lasting cash-flow shocks to affect the level of intangible investments. Still, to be able to 
fully extract values from the investments in intangible assets, one must also combine 
them with investment in fixed assets and hence, there may be a positive relation 
between the two as well. Depending on the role of intangible assets in firms’ value 
creation, the significance and sign of intangibles to firms’ investments is expected to 
vary.  
                                                 
10 Fazzari and Petersen (1993) find that working capital with and without inventories has significant 
negative effect on fixed investments, providing evidence that all components of working capital 
contribute to the adjustment of fixed investments. 
11 If the R&D or advertising costs are expensed, they are more like non-debt tax shields.  
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The effect of labour (L) on investments is measured through the number of employees. 
With the same logic as in the case of intangible assets, labour can be used to adjust price 
shocks in the long-term. If labour can adjust to price shocks, then price fluctuations lead 
a firm to change its labour-capital ratio. This causes the marginal revenue of capital 
products to change by more than the movements in prices. The labour to fixed assets 
ratio also indicates changes in technical substitution or automation rate. This measure is 
usually found to be positive for a growing firm.  
Growth (G) measured as a perpetual change in sales is a partial proxy for investment 
demand. Although growing firms are expected to have more flexibility in their choices 
of future investments, the costs associated with information asymmetry and agency 
relations are also higher. Therefore, highly leveraged growing firms may eventually be 
forced to reduce their investments. On the other hand, expected future growth may also 
make a firm invest more because otherwise it may signal lower future profitability, 
which may prove to be even more costly to the firm. 
Cash-flow (CF) to fixed capital measures the financial flexibility or availability of 
internal funds relative to fixed capital. The larger the cash flows, the more they can 
support a firm’s investment plans. In many studies this measure is found to be the most 
important variable explaining investment behaviour. The measure is expected to be 
positively related to investments because firms can reduce their dependence on costly 
external financing despite information asymmetry, and because management can be 
more prone to overinvest for its own benefit. 
Variance of cash-flow (LVCF) measured in logarithm is a proxy for business risk and it 
affects both investment and debt levels. Minton and Schrand (1999) find that the 
volatility of cash flow is associated with lower investments due to higher frequency of 
cash-flow shortfalls and with higher costs of accessing external financing. It may have 
affect investments because financially constrained firms in particular may find it 
necessary to adjust fixed investments relative to cash-flow shocks. On the other hand, 
the uncertainty can also increase investments if the higher tail in the payoffs distribution 
increases more than the lower tail. However, in general the effect of uncertainty over 
investments is often found to be ambiguous.  
The variable D represents the vector of industrial sector and time-specific dummies that 
are used to capture unobservable sector and technology effects. 
 
4.2. Determinants of financial flexibility  
The financial decision (F) model given the conditions discussed previously is specified 
in the following way: 
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We use the adjustment of the firm’s debt level as a proxy for financial flexibility. 
Optimal leverage is measured as the total book value of long-term debt (D) divided by 
total assets (A). The debt is allowed to vary across firms and over time and to be a 
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function of determining variables. One of the main factors subject to intense debate in 
empirical capital structure studies is a measure of leverage, that is whether to use the 
market or book value of debt as the correct measure for leverage. In practise, both 
measures are often used and compared12. In this paper, we choose to use book values 
because they are more often used in making decisions on the variables of interest here. 
Since we are here interested in the components of financial flexibility that have affect 
on financing decisions13, we include financial working capital (FWC), tangible assets 
(K), non-debt tax shields (NDTS) and variance of cash-flows (LVCF) to the set of 
explanatory variables.  
Firms are expected to adjust deficit between their operating earnings and investment by 
acquiring external financing or using short-term financial assets. In regards to the 
discussion on real flexibility, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) state that apart from being an 
important use of funds, working capital is also a source of funds because it provides 
liquidity for adjusting fixed investments relative to fluctuations in cash flow without the 
need for costly external financing. Hence, we believe firms react to short-term deficits 
by adjusting the slack in their working capital. However, as we are more interested in 
short-term financial flexibility that can be thought of as relaxing firms’ short-run 
financing constraints by reducing adjustment costs, we use financial working capital 
(FWC), i.e. cash and marketable securities less short-term debt, as a proxy for it. 
Financial working capital thus measures net position in liquid assets by relating liquid 
assets to short-term debt. Therefore, it also gives a better picture of a firm’s short-term 
financial flexibility than pure liquid assets that is often used as a corresponding measure 
in literature. Nevertheless, we believe that the literature on liquid assets14 can still 
provide empirical predictions or can be used as a reference for financial flexibility, 
although not without caution.  
Tangible assets (K) measured as net fixed assets restrict the risk of asset substitution 
and such assets have more value in liquidation and thus improve debt capacity by 
offering one form of collateral to possible lenders. Collateralised lending where lenders 
do not need to be compensated for information costs behaves much like “risk-free debt”. 
Change in the amount of risk-free debt should not change the firm’s risk status and thus 
should not have impact on the financing costs. Here we expect the results to be similar 
to the result from all corporate finance theories about fixed assets: the greater the share 
                                                 
12 Those who favour the use of the book value measure present two strong arguments for their choice. 
First, the main cost of borrowing is the expected cost of financial distress in the event of bankruptcy. 
Financial distress raises the cost of capital and thus, affects the optimal leverage. In such situations, the 
value of the distressed firm is closer to its book value because at bankruptcy the debt-holders claim is 
based on the book value of debt. In addition, changes in the market value of debt issued do not affect the 
interest tax shields. Second, managers think in terms of book ratios rather than market values. Of course, 
book values are also more easily accessible, more accurately recorded, and not subject to market 
volatility. On the other hand, those favouring market values over book value argue that the market value 
ultimately determines the real value of a firm. They also suggest that a firm could have negative book 
value for equity while simultaneously having positive market value. This is possible because a negative 
book value reflects previous losses while a positive market value denotes the expected future cash flows 
of the firm.  
13 Harris and Raviv (1991) identified the following attributes to affect the choice of capital structure: 
leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities and size; and decreases 
with volatility of cash flows, probability of bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of assets.  
14 See e.g. Kim et al (1998) and Opler et al (1999) 
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of the total asset composed of tangible assets, the more collateral value a firm has and 
the greater leverage with lower financial costs the firm is able to maintain. However, the 
more specialized the fixed assets are, the higher the costs a firm faces when adjusting its 
capital stock.  
We measure non-debt tax shields (NDTS) as the total depreciation and provisions. Also, 
R&D and advertising expenses are often used as a proxy for non-debt tax shields15, but 
we ignored them due to a lack of data. To reduce taxes, the firm may use non-debt tax 
shields as a substitute for the tax shields provided by the interest rates. However, the 
non-debt tax shields may also be related to collateral values and thus, to asset specificity 
or uniqueness depending on the denominator. Therefore, we use two measures for the 
non-debt tax shields that we expect to proxy different effects. As depreciation and 
provisions are more for the smoothing of taxes rather than for financing purposes as 
such, the depreciation to the firm’s cash flow that is expected to measure the “real” 
effects of the non-debt tax shields denoted as NDTS/CF. The other measure for non-
debt tax shields is a depreciation to total asset which reflects asset specificity or re-
deployability of assets, labelled NDTS/A. As NDTS/A measures the reverse depreciation 
time, the smaller its mean value the greater is the information asymmetry linked to the 
assets. Hence, the more specialized the assets are, the less their market value in 
liquidation, which again reduces the debt capacity. However, specialised assets can also 
increase company value as described earlier and therefore, the sign can be the opposite 
as well. Yet we expect both measures of the non-debt tax shields to be negatively 
correlated with firms’ debt capacity.  
With regards to the effects of volatility of cash flow (LVCF) on investments, Minton and 
Schrand (1999) state that the volatility of cash flow is also associated with higher costs 
of accessing external financing. The increase in variance of cash flows increases the 
expected bankruptcy costs due to the increased probability of bankruptcy and thus 
eventually results in a higher financial costs and lower level of leverage. However, 
under limited liability, shareholders may still benefit from increases in the volatility of 
cash flows because of better abilities for asset substitution or over-investment due to the 
asymmetric effect in payoffs. In addition, volatility of cash-flows decreases the value of 
interest rate tax shields and non-debt tax shields (e.g. depreciation) because it is more 
likely that they are not beneficial to a firm. 
Vector  represents again the vector of the industrial sector- and time-specific 
dummies that are used to capture unobservable sector and exogenous technology 
effects.  
D
 
4.3. Determinants of speeds of adjustments 
Empirically, the speed of adjustment can be estimated in terms of the observable 
determinant variables affecting the speed of adjustment in real and financial decisions 
and is given as follows:   
                                                 
15 Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) find negative relations between debt and R&D because of agency costs 
and non-debt tax shields. These findings are also qualitatively supported by Long and Malitz (1985) and 
Titman & Wessel (1988). 
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The speeds of adjustments towards the optimal level of investments and debt are 
expected to depend on the variables affecting the optimal levels. They are allowed to 
vary across firms and over time and be a function of determinant variables. Industry and 
time-specific effects may also differ across optimal and adjustment rate equations. With 
the exception of a distance variable, we have included the same four variables 
measuring cost effects into both the speed of adjustment functions to allow comparison 
between real and financial flexibility. The included cost variables are distance from the 
optimal (DIST), firm size (SIZE), profitability (CF), and growth opportunities (Q).    
In general, the adjustment costs are expected to depend on the distance from the optimal 
and the speed chosen to adjust towards it. The farther a firm is from its optimal and the 
faster it chooses to adjust towards the optimal, then the more costly the adjustment is 
expected to become. Adjustment costs thus force a firm to think about the future, as too 
fast accumulation of capital is costly, and too slow, on the other hand, results in lost 
profits. Therefore, they also indicate the irreversibility of decisions.  
The distance from the optimal (DIST) measured as distance between optimal and 
observed levels in both investment and debt levels can be used to explain variation in 
the speed of adjustment. The likelihood of adjustment is assumed to increase with 
increasing distance. If there are high fixed costs attached to the adjustment, then we 
expect them to increase also with increasing distance. The relations with the speed of 
adjustment and the distance from the optimal may either be positive indicating that large 
deviations are adjusted faster externally, or negative indicating respectively slower and 
smaller internal adjustments using e.g. flexibility. 
Firm size (SIZE) measured as the log of total assets is also expected to be an important 
issue in adjustment process. Firm size is expected to be positively associated with the 
speed of adjustment. It can be assumed that larger firms may find it easier to adjust both 
their real and financial structures because of smaller information asymmetry, i.e. there is 
more information available. Larger firms are also generally more diversified and have 
access to a wider range of financial markets. These firms then face both a lower 
probability of bankruptcy and lower adjustment costs. As large firms can have small 
adjustments made relative to their total assets, but still requiring a large amount of 
money to be raised externally, large firms may find it more convenient to adjust faster, 
i.e. only when the deviations are large enough. On the other hand, the larger the firm is 
the less fixed adjustment costs are assumed to matter due to economies of scale in the 
adjustments and thus the larger firms may also have a slower adjustment speed. 
We also include cash-flow or profitability (CF) and expectations of investment 
opportunities (Q) for the determinants of adjustment costs. This is because of their 
causality problems and their forward-looking nature, i.e. expectations. CF and Q are 
variables to be affected by using flexibility and on the other hand, they are also parts of 
flexibility. Indeed, we are not sure whether the correlation between investments and 
cash flow is caused by financial constraints or by changes in expectations of investment 
opportunities. Despite the unknown nature of their relations, both of the variables can be 
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used under asymmetric information to measure signalling effects; Q proxies market 
reactions to signals whereas profitability is one of the main signalling devices available 
to management. We expect both variables to have a negative effect on adjustment costs: 
the more investment opportunities a firm has and the more profitable a firm is, the 
slower it is expected to adjust towards its firm-specific optimal levels of investment and 
debt. 
Profitability (CF), a proxy for internal finance and future profitability, is a controversial 
issue, not only due to causality problems but also because of the adjustment issues. 
Profitability may in fact induce borrowing to reduce taxes and to control free cash-flow 
problems. Debt providers can also be more willing to lend because the cash-flow serves 
as collateral. In general, the more profitable firms have lower probability of bankruptcy 
and therefore, they are able to have greater leverage. This supports the information 
asymmetry view of financial decision-making, where internal funds are preferred to 
external funds. However, the higher level of profitability can also offset the need for 
external finance, and thus, result in lower leverage. Still in any case, more profitable 
firms can better support their value-adding investments. Therefore, profitability should 
be negatively related to both of the speeds of adjustments by allowing slower 
adjustment.  
Tobin’s Q (Q) measured here as the market value of capital stock to its replacement 
value is a basic variable explaining both the expectations of investment demand and 
financial capacity to implement those investment opportunities. However, Q proxies the 
investment opportunities only under the rational expectation hypothesis16. The 
differential between market value and fundamentals is generally attributed to “investor 
sentiment”17, which creates a problem for the Q models insofar as investment decisions 
are based on fundamentals. Sentiments create opportunities for firms, although 
debatable, to use them for their own advantage. In general, growth opportunities 
increase information asymmetry and under-investment problems, especially if a firm is 
leveraged and has growth opportunities. Although the debt can control some of the free 
cash flow problems by limiting management’s propensity to over invest, higher 
expected future growth usually still means a greater need for external finance. In the 
long run, this means a greater amount of equity and thus, lower leverage, but in the 
short-term, debt is preferred resulting in a higher leverage. By borrowing against future 
expectations, the firm will enable its current investments but will put a firm in risk of 
facing fluctuations in its cash flows and thus, higher cost of financing for future 
investments. Yet, firms with higher growth opportunities are also expected to adjust 
with lower costs.  
 
5. EMPRIRICAL RESULTS 
We have four goals here. First, we compare the performance of the static models 
serving as our reference models of investment and financing with those of the system of 
dynamic partial adjusting models. Second, we focus on the results of the system of 
                                                 
16 Imperfect competition on markets, convex adjustment costs, heterogeneous capital markets and 
interaction of investment and financial decisions invalidate q-theory (Hayashi (1982) and (1985)). 
17 Investor sentiment includes e.g. excess volatility, mean reversion, fads, or speculative bubbles in 
financial markets. 
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dynamic models and investigate if and how well they match the theoretical predictions. 
Third, we seek to identify determinants of financial and real flexibility in investment 
and finance decisions. Finally, we analyse the key issue of our study, namely the 
interaction of real and financial flexibility and their effects on investment and finance 
decisions. The objective is to see whether the results improve our understanding of 
these interdependent interactions. 
The key differences between the static models and the system of dynamic partially 
adjusting models are that the latter adds a lag dependent variable and flexible speed of 
adjustment with its cost parameters to the models and allows an interdependence 
between one decision to another, which is labelled as feedback. These procedures 
improve significantly the explanatory power of the model by increasing the adjusted R2 
and reducing the unexplained errors measured as root mean square error (RMSE). In the 
investment function, the adjusted R2 is improved from 0.20 to 0.52 and RMSE reduced 
from 0.25 to 0.19, whereas in the financing function, the corresponding improvements 
are even greater: R2 jumps from 0.10 to 0.82 and RMSE drops from 0.30 to 0.13. 
Hence, our modelling approach seems to offer a more complete picture of the firms’ 
value creation than those found in the existing literature. 
Indeed, the explanatory variables used to explain endogenous decision variables were 
found to be highly relevant and to have a significantly positive impact on the model 
performance when they are included into the system of dynamic models. The presence 
of the significant adjustment speed parameters and the predicted feedback effects also 
indicate that the dynamic system of equations is preferred to the single dynamic 
equation models and models excluding feedback effects. In Table 2, we provide a 
summary of the estimation results generated from both the static and dynamic model 
specifications.  
 
5.1. Investment model 
Results from the static investment model indicate that the intangible assets (IT), growth 
(G), internal finance (CF/A), variance of cash-flows (LVCF) and time effect are 
positively and significantly related to the changes in investment levels. However, in the 
systems of dynamic equations, all of the variables included in the static model (i.e. also 
real working capital (RWC), labour (L) and intercept) increase in both effects and 
statistical significance by maintaining signs. This indicates the relevance of the results 
and superiority of the system of dynamic models.  
Over time, investments have decreased slightly. The strong negative intercept indicates 
further that firms find it relatively hard to invest or that the investments are large.  
When firms undertake investment in fixed assets, they also seem to invest in real 
working capital, labour, and intangible assets. Real working capital has a small and 
positive association with investments. Labour, perhaps unexpectedly, has a large 
positive effect on investments, which is contrary to the case of automation or 
substitution of labour to fixed capital claims. As intangible assets can also capture some 
of the expected growth, the results show that firms in this mature industry tend also to 
invest in uniqueness or asset specificity. Together, the results of the labour and 
intangible assets suggest that the firms seem to believe quite strongly in their future 
investment opportunities. 
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The growth and cash-flow increase most dramatically in their positive effects despite 
the simultaneous increase in their standard deviations. This may be due to their more 
direct correlation with the financial variables, although growth is primarily related to 
investment demand, whereas the cash flow partially measuring financial flexibility is 
related to investment supply. Results suggest that firms that have more growth 
opportunities and are more profitable also tend to invest more.  
The volatility of cash flows has a small but significant effect on investments. This 
supports the real option approach, where uncertainty increases the value of investments 
and thus, also the investment activity. 
 
5.2. Financing model 
The static financing model supports the theoretical prediction with regard to the 
tangibility of assets (K), non-debt tax shields (NDTS/A) and variance of cash flows 
(LVCF). Their effects are however strengthened in the system of dynamic adjustment 
models, in which also the financial working capital (FWC), non-debt tax shield 
(NDTS/CF), intercept and time-effect become significant. Interestingly, the variance of 
cash flows (LVCF) is an exception because it loses its statistical significance when the 
effects of the system are investigated.  
Leverage has slightly increased during the period of the study, although intercept is 
found to be significant and have a high negative impact on the long-term debt. This 
means that firms find it relatively hard to raise debt or that the financing needs are large.  
Financial working capital has a positive relationship with changes in debt levels. This 
supports the trade-off theory. As financial working capital measures the short-term net 
financing position, it may also act as partial collateral for lenders, thereby reducing the 
probability of bankruptcy and enabling higher leverage. 
The high negative relationship between the first measure of the non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS/A) relative to total assets supports predictions made by the trade-off theory. 
However, the other measure of non-debt tax shields (NDTS/CF) to cash-flows shows a 
slightly positive relation with debt levels. These opposite effects may be a result of the 
fact that the variables measure different aspects of the capital structure. Indeed, the first 
measure can capture more of the uniqueness of assets than the effect of non-debt tax 
shields, because it measures the duration of capital stock in reverse manner and thus, 
actually the amount of information asymmetry. The latter measures the tax-effects of 
the non-debt tax shields on cash flows more directly.18 
It should also be noted that depreciation and other provisions capture only partially the 
non-debt tax shields that are substitutes for the interest rate tax-shields. This is because 
they are associated with fixed asset and thus, the measure ignores more intangible tax 
deductions. The positive relation with debt and non-debt tax shields can be explained by 
Scott’s (1977) secured debt hypothesis, where high investment in tangible assets create 
high levels of non-debt tax shields but low borrowing cost due to high collateral value. 
Thus, Scott’s hypothesis also relates the debt capacity to asset tangibility. Tangibility of 
assets is positively related to leverage as is predicted by all the corporate finance theory 
                                                 
18 Titman and Wessels (1988) show very similar results and provide a more thorough analysis of the 
existing contradiction between the two non-debt tax shield measures.  
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strands and many empirical studies as well. Hence, tangible assets serve as collaterals 
that enhance debt capacity by lowering the costs of raising debt. 
Interestingly, volatility of cash flows, which is important and weakly significant in the 
static model, is insignificant in the system model. It seems that volatility of cash-flows 
does not have any effect on the debt levels or financial status of firms.  
 
5.3.  Feedback effects 
Looking at the feedback effects indicated by parameters Fα and Rβ , we see that the 
effects of predicted debt ( ) and investment (Fˆ Rˆ ) variables are close to being equal 
with high positive and significant effects on the respective models. Thus, the system 
seems to be relatively balanced, as proved by the symmetric feedback effects. The 
results indicate that an increase in debt increases investments and vice versa. This 
shows that investments are on average too large to be financed with pure flexibility and 
thus, they are financed primarily using debt. Hence, these feedback effects show that 
there is an interaction with the real and financial decisions, which contradicts the 
hypothesis of perfect and complete markets. 
 
5.4. Adjustment costs 
Both the speeds of adjustments have increased slightly over time, although the rise in 
investment speed of adjustment has been almost double compared with the one in the 
financing case. High negative and significant intercept in financial speed of adjustment 
means that the adjustments to be made are large or the adjustment costs are high. The 
null hypothesis of intercept is, however, not rejected in the case of the investment speed 
of adjustment.  
The distance is strongly and positively related to the speed of adjustment in both of the 
models. This is logical, especially if the adjustment costs are high, because as the 
distance to the optimal grows so do the costs related to it and thus, the faster firms want 
to adjust to their firm-specific optimal levels. This lends support to the view of convex 
adjustment costs. As this effect is twice as large in the financial adjustment as it is in the 
investment adjustment, the importance of maintaining the financial optimal is 
emphasized even at the expense of optimal investments. 
Profitability is found to have a strong and negative impact on changes in the speed of 
adjustment in both the investment and finance decisions. This indicates that more 
profitable firms have more time to adjust their investments and financing. The pattern 
also highlights the importance of internal financing as a source of flexibility in both the 
decisions. Still, the effect of profitability in financing adjustment is more than twice that 
in investment adjustment process. This is an indication that there can also be other 
variables playing a role in the investment adjustment process. 
Growth opportunities and size do not seem to matter, as they were found to be 
statistically insignificant. This may relate to an industry-specific phenomenon and our 
selection criteria, where only firms with total sales over USD 200M were included. The 
insignificance of growth opportunities could also indicate that the rational expectation 
hypothesis does not apply.  
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5.5. Speeds of adjustments 
Table 3 represents the mean values of the parameters of the speeds of adjustments. The 
speed of adjustment in the investment model is positive and increasing over time. There 
are even signs of over-adjustment in the last few years. Still, the adjustment parameter 
is not constant, as commonly assumed in conventional dynamic models and hence, the 
models with flexible adjustment parameters should be preferred. The results also show 
severe under-investment, because the optimal and observed levels of investment deviate 
greatly from each other. This lends support to the on-going consolidation in the 
industry. The larger deviations together with the higher speed of adjustment result in a 
faster adjustment of the observed to optimal level of investment. The large swings 
observed in the optimal and observed investments also cause the optimality ratio to 
fluctuate widely. The swings are probably caused by the large investments, e.g. mergers 
and acquisitions, which need time to be digested and accomplished.   
The speed of adjustment in the financial model starts from the negative values and then 
increases over time to become positive. It seems that firms first use internal flexibility 
and then after the exhaustion of the internal financial flexibility, acquire external 
financing. This could indicate a counter cyclical behaviour. Still, the adjustment speed 
in general is quite low, which means that firms believe that they are in their optimal. 
According to the results, firms are, however, more leveraged than the optimal would 
suggest. This is further supported by the earlier under-investment claim. Finally, both 
the optimal and observed leverage fluctuate quite widely and as a result, the optimality 
ratio varies, but with a tendency to grow over time.  
In Table 4, we report the correlations between the speeds of adjustments and other 
relevant variables. The speed of adjustment in investments increases strongly over time, 
while the optimal and observed investments decrease slightly. As a result, the optimality 
ratio of investments also decreases over time. The optimal and observed investments are 
positively correlated with both the adjustment speeds and each other. The speed of 
adjustment in financing increases over time and relative to the optimal and observed 
debt levels, which are themselves positively correlated with each other and over time. 
Thus, the optimality ratio of debt increases over time.  
The speed of adjustments in investments and the observed investments are positively 
correlated with all the financial adjustment parameters indicating that the investments 
are financed largely externally with debt. Interestingly, the speed of adjustment in 
financing and the optimality ratios in financing and investments are negatively 
correlated, which means that the larger deviations are adjusted more slowly, perhaps 
due to high financial adjustment costs. This would indicate serious market 
imperfections caused by financial adjustment costs. These costs have severe a negative 
impact on investments and financing decisions and could cause mean reversion in the 
investment and debt ratios. It seems that at least in this industry, the financial 
adjustment costs are more restrictive factors for a firm’s value creation than the 
investment adjustment costs.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper aims at improving our knowledge of joint and interdependent firm 
investment and financing decisions. Hence, we have analysed the interaction of firm 
flexibilities and their effects on these decisions. We have argued that both real and 
financial flexibilities can be used to delay or smooth the effects of more permanent and 
costly changes in investment and debt levels. To study these flexibilities and their 
interactions as well as effects on the decisions, we have introduced a system of 
interdependent dynamic partial adjustment models that allows us to estimate and 
analyse the indicators of flexibility: speed, costs, and efficiency of the firm-specific 
adjustments towards the optimal, and the feedback effects from one decision to another. 
The empirical analysis is based on a large sample of paper and pulp producing 
multinational companies observed during the period 1992 to 2002.  
The empirical results show that our dynamic formulation dramatically improves the 
explanatory power of the model compared to the static models. Furthermore, the 
independent variables used to explain investment and financing decisions increase in 
their effect and significance while maintaining expected signs. We find also that 
investments have slightly decreased over time and have a positive relationship with all 
the explanatory variables: real working capital, intangible assets, labour, growth, cash 
flows and variance of cash-flows. Leverage has instead increased over time and is 
positively related to financial working capital, tangible assets, and non-debt tax shields 
to cash flows. The non-debt tax shields to total assets, i.e. measure of uniqueness of 
assets, have instead negative effect on the leverage. The variance of cash flows is found 
to be insignificant. The feedback effects from one sub-model to another are found to be 
strongly positive and approximately of equal size, thereby showing a strong 
interdependence between the two decisions.  
The speed of adjustment is expected to proxy adjustment costs (distance, size, 
profitability, and expected investment opportunities) and partially flexibility. Absolute 
distance has positive and profitability negative effect on the adjustment speed. The 
effect of distance lends support to the convex adjustment costs, i.e. the farther a firm is 
from its optimal the faster it adjusts towards it. Profitability indicates instead that more 
profitable firms have more time to adjust their investment and financing levels. In 
addition, the results show that the effects of distance and profitability to the adjustment 
speeds are twice as large in financing as they are in investments. Size and market-to-
book value show insignificant effects on the speeds of adjustments.  
The speeds of adjustments in both cases increase over time, but they are not constant as 
commonly assumed in traditional dynamic models and hence, the models with flexible 
adjustment parameters like ours should be preferred. The results show severe under-
investment but slight over-leverage among the sample firms. The firms also seem to 
adjust their leverage first internally and then after the exhaustion of internal resources, 
externally by using debt financing. The speeds of adjustments in investments and 
financing are positively correlated with each other, which further emphasizes the 
interaction of the real and financial decisions. The speed of adjustment in investment is 
also positively correlated with the optimality ratio of debt. However, the speed of 
adjustment in financing is negatively correlated with both of the optimality ratios. This 
means that the larger in-optimalities in investment and financing are adjusted more 
slowly because of the high adjustment costs in financing. This is an indication of serious 
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market imperfections as a form of financial constraints. As a result, the interaction with 
the investment and finance decisions and the flexibilities related to them is indisputable 
and thus, contradicts the perfect and complete market hypothesis. 
With respect to the implications of our findings, we would like to emphasise that as 
investment and financial adjustments are controlled by the endogenous and interacting 
flexibilities, it is therefore hard to make any suggestions regarding policy interventions. 
The results are, however, tentative and should thus be interpreted with caution. At the 
firm level, we note that although real and financial flexibility interact, the financial 
flexibility is more visible to markets and thus, the adjustment costs related to it are 
likely to dominate both the investment and financing adjustment processes. However, 
stronger evidence is needed for making inferences. Therefore, we encourage systematic 
application of similar modelling techniques to a wider range of industries and firms with 
more heterogeneous sizes, and perhaps preferably covering a longer period of time. 
Different mixes of variables for the adjustment costs and determinant variables across 
investment and debt equations could also give new insights into the nature of the 
relations studied and the adjustment processes that are so important to corporate value 
creation. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the data, NT=629, 1994-2002. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
I     0.095     0.276    -0.411     2.228 
RWC     0.287     0.512    -2.553     5.010 
IT     0.097     0.216     0.000     1.726 
L     0.006     0.011     0.000     0.161 
G     0.104     0.312    -0.790     5.323 
CF/K     0.243     0.243    -0.337     3.489 
D     0.256     0.317     0.000     6.296 
FWC    -0.044     0.138    -0.968     0.756 
K     0.567     0.227     0.117     2.083 
NDTS/A     0.053     0.046    -0.053     0.612 
NDTS/CF     0.499     0.461    -1.048     6.273 
SIZE     6.847     1.104     0.000     9.495 
Q     1.279     1.594    -9.266     9.940 
CF/A     0.122     0.113    -0.170     1.290 
VCF 4.1161571E14 2.6747717E15   3463712.00   2.2003429E16
K 63222023.11 226044952.98     30172.00  2018017792.00
A 122873017.75 400278944.46     49441.00  3123862784.00
CF  9324291.83  35477425.21 -227623248.00   355036928.00
Notes: Investment (I), real working capital (RWC), intangible assets (IT), labour (L), growth (G), fixed 
assets (K), assets (A), cash-flows (CF), long-term debt (D), non-debt tax shields (NDTS), firm 
size (SIZE), investment opportunity (Q), variance of cash flow (VCF).    
 
 26
Lindström and Heshmati / Interaction of Real and Financial Flexibility 
Table 2. Single static and system of dynamic partial adjusting models parameter 
estimates, NT=629. 
Variables Single static models System of dynamic models 
Variables Estimates Std. Errors Estimates Std. Errors 
A. Determinants of investment equation: 
α0 -0.1384.  0.0740      -0.5792a 0.0744 
αRWC -0.0105.  0.0202       0.0850a 0.0146 
αIT
α
  0.1344b  0.0502  0.1505a  0.0322 
L  2.0043.  1.0741  2.1601c 0.9036 
αG  0.2743a  0.0334  1.1510a      0.2262 
αCF  0.2007a  0.0470  1.6143a 0.2867 
αLVCF  0.0078b  0.0024  0.0135a  0.0021  
αT -0.0089c  0.0040      -0.0266a 0.0037  
αD    1.8679a  0.0942 
B. Determinants of financing equation: 
β0  0.1360.  0.0917 -0.7821a  0.0725 
βFWC
β
  0.0601.  0.0934  0.1920c 0.0793 
K  0.4423a  0.0550  0.8506a 0.0474 
βNDTS/A -0.7909b  0.2957      -1.8535a 0.1897 
βNDTS/CF  0.0236.  0.0265  0.0907b      0.0330 
βLVCF -0.0064c  0.0028       0.0002. 0.0019 
βT  0.0090.  0.0048  0.0511a 0.0056 
βI    1.7759a 0.0634 
C. Determinants of speed of adjustment in investment equation: 
ς0    0.1818. 0.2028 
ςSIZE
ς
    0.0004. 0.0262 
CFA   -0.4586b  0.1545 
ςQ   -0.0064.  0.0144 
ςT    0.0781a  0.0119 
ςIDIST    0.3751a 0.0493 
D. Determinants of speed of adjustment in financing equation: 
ξ0   -0.3472b 0.1168 
ξSIZE    0.0020. 0.0149 
ξCFA   -1.1055a 0.0887 
ξQ   -0.0102.  0.0096 
ξT    0.0412a 0.0066 
ξDDIST    0.7452a 0.0513 
Performance of the models: 
       Single static models  System of dynamic models  
 Investment Financing Investment Financing 
Adj. R2 0.2004 0.0968      0.5201 0.8238 
RMSE 0.2472     0.3012     0.1915 0.1331 
Notes: Significant at the less than 1%(a), 1-5%(b), 5-10%(c), and more than 10%(.) level 
of significance.  
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Table 3. Mean variables by year, NT=629. 
 
Year 
Speed of 
adjustment, 
δR 
Optimal 
investment, 
R* 
Observed 
investment, 
R 
Optimality 
ratio, 
R*/R 
Speed of 
adjustment, 
δF 
Optimal 
leverage, 
F* 
Observed 
leverage, 
F 
Optimality 
ratio, 
F*/F 
1994         0.560 0.647 0.097  6.675 -0.165 0.026 0.239 0.110
1995         
         
         
         
         
0.722 0.877 0.208  4.221 -0.116 0.215 0.240 0.897
1996 0.689 0.476 0.080  5.982 -0.067 0.051 0.212 0.239
1997 0.797 0.537 0.086  6.263 -0.018 0.131 0.256 0.511
1998 0.901 0.608 0.171  3.552  0.028 0.197 0.289 0.680 
1999 0.927 0.537 0.026 20.695  0.047 0.158 0.230 0.685
2000 1.099 0.737 0.087  8.468  0.043 0.287 0.256 1.118 
2001 1.084 0.482 0.080  6.002  0.116 0.237 0.243 0.975 
2002 1.146 0.392 0.037 10.648  0.176 0.294 0.341 0.863
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of the adjustment parameters, NT=629. 
   Year Speed of
adjustment, 
δ
 Optimal 
investment, 
R* R 
Observed 
investment, 
R 
Optimality 
ratio, 
R*/R 
Speed of 
adjustment, 
δF 
Optimal 
leverage, 
F* 
Observed 
leverage, 
F 
Optimality 
ratio, 
F*/F 
Year 1.000         
δR         
         
         
          
         
          
          
          
0.764a 1.000
R* -0.124b 0.359a 1.000
R -0.101c 0.227a 0.579a 1.000
R*/R
 
-0.121b -0.012. 0.196a 0.198a 1.000
δF 0.412a 0.300a -0.281a 0.003. -0.158b 1.000
F* 0.210a 0.486a 0.660a 0.581a 0.138b 0.221a 1.000
F 0.058. 0.112b 0.104b 0.224a 0.001. 0.371a 0.491a 1.000
F*/F 0.201a 0.318a 0.448a 0.223a 0.177b -0.189a 0.548a 0.046. 1.000
Notes: Significant at the less than 1%(a), 1-5%(b), 5-10%(c), and more than 10%(.) level of significance.  
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Appendix 1. Description of the data and variables. 
Data source:   DATASTREAM - Company account data 
Date:  August 8, 2003 
Search criteria: 
Datatype  Limitation Unit No. of matches 
Composite code  ALL AREAS 
Industry classification  PAPER  Default 363 
Total sales  OVER200  MILLIONS 5903  
No. of total matches: 87 
Time period:   1992-2002, annualised 
Total no. of observation: 957  
Data types: 
Datastream item Description 
104   Total sales 
696   Depreciation and operating provisions 
1502                                   Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation  
305   Equity capital and reserves 
309   Borrowings repayable within 1 year 
321   Total loan capital (repayable after 1 year) 
339   Total fixed assets – net  
344   Total intangibles 
375   Total cash and equivalent 
376   Total current assets 
389   Total current liabilities 
392   Total assets 
MV  Market value / market capitalisation  
NTA = 305 - 344 Net tangible assets/ Book Value 
219   Total number of employees 
Definition of variables included in the models: 
Symbol  Definition 
K   Total fixed assets – net (339) 
R   New fixed investments = Kt-Kt-1 
RWC  Real Working Capital = Total current assets (376) - Total current 
liabilities (389) - FWC 
FWC  Financial Working Capital = Total cash and equivalent (375) - 
Total loan capital (repayable within 1 year) (309) 
IT    Total intangibles (344)   
L    Total number of employees (219) 
G    Growth = (Salest- Salest-1)/ Salest-1, Sales = Total sales (104) 
CF  Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation 
(EBITDA) (1502) 
LVCF   Log(variance of (CF)) 
NDTS  Non-Debt Tax Shields = Depreciation and operating provisions 
(696) 
A  Total assets (392) 
F   Total loan capital (repayable after 1 year) (321) 
SIZE    Log(A)  
Q  Market value (MV) / Book value (NTA=equity capital and 
reserves (305) - total intangibles (344)) 
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Appendix 2. Pearson correlation coefficients for various variables. 
 
 Year R RWC  IT L G  CF/K  F FWC  K NDTS/A NDTS/CF SIZE Q CF/A LVCF 
year                  1.000
R 
p-value 
-0.101 
 0.010 
 1.000               
              
             
            
           
          
         
        
RWC 
p-value 
 0.068 
 0.087 
 0.005 
 0.897  
 1.000
IT 
p-value 
 0.163 
 0.001 
 0.164 
 0.001  
 0.028 
 0.472 
 1.000
L 
p-value 
-0.047 
 0.238 
 0.132 
 0.001  
 0.124 
 0.001 
 0.342 
 0.001 
 1.000
G 
p-value 
-0.059 
 0.137 
 0.373 
 0.001  
-0.066 
 0.096 
 0.063 
 0.111 
 0.038 
 0.330 
 1.000
CF/K 
p-value 
-0.041 
 0.299 
 0.291 
 0.001  
 0.242 
 0.001 
 0.231 
 0.001 
 0.324 
 0.001 
 0.289 
 0.001 
 1.000
F 
p-value 
 0.058 
 0.139 
 0.224 
 0.001  
-0.135 
 0.001 
 0.219 
 0.001 
 0.070 
 0.078 
 0.571 
 0.001 
-0.038 
 0.334 
 1.000
FWC 
p-value 
-0.082 
 0.038 
-0.003 
 0.940  
-0.169 
 0.001 
 0.050 
 0.204 
-0.037 
 0.346 
-0.007 
 0.858 
 0.098 
 0.013 
 0.064 
 0.105 
 1.000
K 
p-value 
-0.068 
 0.085 
 0.626 
 0.001  
-0.240 
 0.001 
 0.010 
 0.797 
-0.062 
 0.120 
 0.359 
 0.001 
 0.057 
 0.151 
 0.283 
 0.001 
 0.015 
 0.704 
 1.000       
NDTS/A 
p-value 
-0.045 
 0.256 
 0.258 
 0.001  
 0.062 
 0.119 
 0.089 
 0.025 
 0.409 
 0.001 
 0.120 
 0.002 
 0.380 
 0.001 
-0.028 
 0.482 
-0.262 
 0.001 
 0.217 
 0.001 
 1.000      
NDTS/CF 
p-value 
 0.046 
 0.245 
-0.037 
 0.348  
 0.025 
 0.520 
 0.058 
 0.145 
 0.045 
 0.259 
-0.065 
 0.103 
-0.076 
 0.055 
-0.002 
 0.949 
-0.068 
 0.088 
-0.095 
 0.016 
 0.133 
 0.001 
 1.000     
SIZE 
p-value 
 0.034 
 0.387 
 0.017 
 0.665  
-0.034 
 0.391 
-0.137 
 0.001 
-0.441 
 0.001 
-0.040 
 0.306 
-0.233 
 0.001 
-0.039 
 0.321 
-0.171 
 0.001 
-0.075 
 0.056 
-0.280 
 0.001 
-0.020 
 0.610 
 1.000    
Q 
p-value 
-0.153 
 0.001 
-0.083 
 0.036  
-0.036 
 0.360 
-0.139 
 0.001 
 0.041 
 0.294 
-0.029 
 0.453 
 0.026 
 0.499 
-0.065 
 0.099 
-0.038 
 0.337 
-0.025 
 0.524 
 0.021 
 0.592 
 0.045 
 0.253 
-0.021
 0.592
 1.000   
CF/A 
p-value 
-0.081 
 0.039 
 0.328 
 0.001  
 0.058 
 0.145 
 0.118 
 0.002 
 0.310 
 0.001 
 0.336 
 0.001 
 0.878 
 0.001 
 0.013 
 0.739 
 0.051 
 0.200 
 0.314 
 0.001 
 0.586 
 0.001 
-0.112 
 0.004 
-0.257
 0.001
 0.030
 0.438
 1.000  
LVCF  
p-value 
-0.054 
 0.173 
 0.047 
 0.230  
-0.040 
 0.312 
-0.118 
 0.002 
-0.424 
 0.001 
-0.025 
 0.524 
-0.184 
 0.001 
-0.071 
 0.072 
-0.126 
 0.001 
 0.007 
 0.858 
-0.251 
 0.001 
-0.077 
 0.052 
 0.918
 0.001
-0.063
 0.111
-0.178 
 0.001 
 1.000 
 30
